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Appellant's Reply Brief is submitted herewith only to 
answer new matters set forth in Respondent's brief as follows: 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT HAS TOTALLY MISCONSTRUED THE NATURE OF THE 
APPEAL. 
In Respondent's brief, Point I, it is argued that 
Appellant is requesting a "De Novo Appeal", and to start anew. 
This is a total misconception of Appellant's brief and the 
prevailing law governing appeal procedures in license revocation 
cases. 
In Appellant's brief at p. 46 it is pointed out that 
recourse to the Courts on this matter, is authorized under Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 §58-1-36 which provides: 
Any ••• holder of a license ••• or any 
person directly affected and aggrieved by any 
ruling of the Department of Registration, may 
within thirty days after notice of such 
ruling INSTITUTE AN ACTION in the District 
Court of the County ••• against the director 
in his official, capacity setting and his 
right to complain. In his answer the 
director may set out any matter in justifica-
tion; AND THE COURT SHALL DETERMINE ISSUES ON 
BOTH QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT, and may 
affirm, set aside or modify the ruling 
complained of. (Emphasis added} 
-1-
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This Court in the case of Withers v. Golding, 100 Otah 
179, 111 P2d 550 (1949), discussed at length what was the intent 
of the legislature in Section 36 and concluded: 
"the Legislature intended to change the 
nature of the proceedings theretofore 
established under the decision in Baker v. 
Department of Registration." 
"This action is instituted against the 
director ..• 
The director may then answer and if he 
desires set up 'any matter in justification' 
of the proceedings and decision rendered 
before the department. The statute then 
provides 'and the Court shall determine the 
issues and both questions of law and fact. ' 
What issues? Certainly not the issues raised 
before the Department of Registration, but 
the issues raised by the pleadings before the 
COURT. The proceeding in the the District 
court is in the nature of an ORIGINAL ACTION. 
These grievances may be ••• any one or all of 
various objections to the procedure and 
action of the department." 
"The issues raised by the pleadings 
before the Court may or may not be the same 
as those raised in the hearing before the 
department." 
" the Court should determine on an 
appeal in equity whether the findings of the 
committee are contrary to the clear prepon-
derance of the evidence adduced BEFORE IT, 
rather than to determine merely whether there 
is any substantial evidence to support such 
findings." (Emphasis added) 
This Court has clearly defined the procedure for this 
"action". It is not a "de novo appeal" as alleged by Respondent, 
-2-
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but a "new action" in which the District Court should have not 
only considered the evidence adduced before the department, but 
allowed the Appellant to introduce such further evidence to 
support its- position, and then, decide the case based upon the 
clear preponderance of the evidence adduced BEFORE IT. 
In the instant matter the District Court failed to 
follow the required procedures or to apply the preponderance of 
evidence standard. The Court treated the appeal only as a review 
of the Departments hearing, and then wrongfully made its decision 
based on the improper evidentiary standard of "substantial 
evidence" instead of the "preponderance of the evidente." 
The District Court's ruling was improper, arbitrary and 
capricious and should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENTS OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE VIOLATED DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW AS THE ONLY COMPETENT EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS BASED 
ON THE EXPERTISE OF THE BOARD MEMBERS AND NOT ON COMPETENT EXPERT 
TESTIMONY. 
In the entire hearing before the Osteopathic Committee, 
only one witness produced by the Respondent namely Dr. Alan J. 
Concors, testified regarding the standard of care "as it is 
taught and as it should be practiced in the State of Utah." See 
Appellant's Brief p. 17-18. 
-3-
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Dr. Concors gave the sole testimony regarding Utah 
Standards of Practice although he had only practiced for one (1) 
month in Utah, and then, by totally unsupported hearsay, 
testified regarding the position of the chairman of the 
Department of Ethics for the Osteopathic General Practitioners 
College, in an apparent attempt to establish a national standard. 
No other expert testimony was introduced by Respondent's 
regarding the standard of care or professionalism in Utah or 
throughout the country, al though three medical experts in the 
same field of practice testified in support of Appellant and 
concluded that his methods of practice were not only professional 
but totally within the acceptable standards of practice among the 
hundreds of Doctors who practice preventative medicine. 
Nevertheless the members of the Osteopathic Committee 
relied on their own expertise as pointed out in Respondent's 
brief at p. 28, to rule on "unprofessional conduct". In the 
leading case of William E. Farney M.D. v. Joan G. Anderson, 
Director of Department of Registration et al, 56 Ill App 3d 677 
(1978), the Illinois Appellate Court held that a hearing by the 
medical disciplinary board in which the board relied on their own 
expertise to determine that the Appellant's conduct was a viola-
tion of due process of law. The Court there concluded at p. 682: 
"The underlying but perhaps unspoken 
reason for requiring exp~rt evidence by the 
-4-
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Department is the existence of judicial 
review of the decisions of the Medicial 
Disciplinary Board while it may seem 
idle and foolish to a board composed of 
physicians to present elementary questions of 
medicine to them by way of testimony of one 
of their own brethren, yet it is far from 
idle to a Court, not trained in medicine, 
which is called upon to determine the 
manifest weight of the evidence." 
In the instant case, the Appellant's experts testified 
that Appellant's methods of practice al though "not used in the 
mainstream of M. D. 's in practice today, are clearly accepted 
methods of treatment and widely used throughout the United States 
today by hundreds of Doctors who are involved in preventative 
medicine [Record p. 623-793, p. 1110-1174, p. 1007-1104]. 
Although clearly establishing that Appellant's methods of 
practice are recognized by hundreds of Doctors practicing 
throughout the United States, not one expert introduced by the 
Respondents testified regarding the standard of care or methods 
of practice among the Appellant's peers or field of practice, and 
the uncorroborated testimony of Dr. Alan Concors, a one (1) month 
resident of Utah, stands alone as the sole expert testimony to 
evidence that Appellant's conduct was "unprofessional", "as it is 
taught and as it should be practiced in the State of Utah." 
A summary of the questions of expert testimony and 
opinion as evidence before administrative tribunals is given in 
Section 353 of McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence (2d 3d 
1972) by Edward w. Cleary, as follows: 
-5-
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" Courts now recognize legislative inten-
tion to establish expert agencies. Therefore, 
agency decisions which rely on the agency's 
own expertness are upheld when Respondent 
offers no contrary expert testimony, or when 
expert testimony off erred by staff members 
and outside experts conflicts •••• an agency 
seeking to rely on its expertise must present 
expert testimony subject to cross examination 
on the record or give Respondent fair 
notification that off icia.l noti<;e will be 
taken of such 'facts'." 
In this case, the Respondent Committee heard no expert 
evidence whatsoever to refute the Appellant's experts and their 
testimony stands alone, unrefuted as to the acceptability of 
Appellants professionalism in his field of practice, and if 
Respondent's revocation is allowed to stand, then it must be 
based upon the committee's own personal expertise as to what they 
believe, and condemn Appellant's privilege of practicing medicine 
because he is not in the mainstream of practice determined by 
some unexpressed views of the two committee members and one 
disqualified member thereof. 
On p. 32 of the Respondent's brief; it is stated that 
"the act of Appellant (ie promising recovery from terminal 
·diseases, using absurd "quackery" procedures such as Kirlian 
photography, hand pressure diagnosis, taking images of thum-
prints, etc.) reflect on his competence, professionalism and in 
essence, his fitness to practice," emphasizes the very 
arbitrariness of the Respondent's revocation. 
-6-
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No expert testimony was introduced regarding these 
alleged "quackery" procedures. Dr. Concors testified with regard 
to Kirlian Photography (Corongram) that he'd never heard of it. 
[Record p. 804] • Regarding hand pressure diagnosis (applied 
Kinesiology) Dr. Concors [Record p. 806] testified there was "no 
medical theory that even purports to that type of diagnostic 
procedure." And yet three experts testifying for Appellant all 
sustained the efficacy of applied Kinesiology as a valuable 
diagnostic technique. 
Although Respondent's argue in their brief at p. 32-34, 
that the term "unprofessional conduct" was adequate notice of the 
standard of required and it was unneccessary for a statute to 
emmunerate the specific acts which constitute unprofessional 
conduct. 
The Oregon State Court in Board of Medical Examiners v. 
Mintz, 233 or 441, 378 P3d 945 (1963) concluded: 
Utah 
"The fact that it is impossible to 
catalogue all of the types of professional 
misconduct is the very reason for setting up 
in broad terms and delegating to the Board 
the function of evaluating the conduct in 
each case." 
However the Utah legislature required more in passing 
Code Annotated 1953 §58-12-36(15) in defining 
"unprofessional conduct" as 
-7-
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" ( 15) any conduct or practice contrary 
to the recognized standards of ethics of the 
medical profession, or any conduct or 
practice which does or might constitute a 
damage to the heal th, welfare or safety of 
the patient or the public, or any conduct, 
pracitice or condition which does or might 
impair the ability, safety and skillfully to 
practice medicine." 
Yet strangely, with the Osteopathic Physicians and 
Surgeons who pr act ice in the State of Utah, who h·ave organized 
the Utah Osteopathic Physicians Association, not one member of 
the Association was called by the Respondents . to testify as to 
the standards of practice and professionalism in the Community, 
and only called upon Dr. Concors, a general practioner, one (1) 
month resident of Utah, who has practiced general practice in a 
clinic with M.D. 's to establish said standards. No expert who 
practices in the field of preventative medicine was called by 
Respondents. 
Nevertheless the legislature in 1976 amended the 
provisions of the Medical Practice Act to provide that 
unprofessional conduct was also: 
"(17) Violation of any rule or regula-
tion of the physicians licensing board, 
establishing a standard of professional 
conduct." 
In mandatory language the legislature also reqired in 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 §58-1-13 upon action of the 
representation committee the Department of Registration "shall" 
perform the function of 
-8-
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" ( 7) Promulgating and enforcing such 
rules and regulations as may be advocated by 
the representative committee ••• for the pro-
tection or best interest of the public •.• ". 
It is clear that the Department and the Committee were 
derelict in their duties. Although the Department spent years in 
accumulating case data, hiring dupes to go to Appellant as 
patients and lie about their symptoms to obtain chelation and 
other forms of treatments, they failed to follow the legislative 
mandate, to publish rules and regulations and standards by which 
a practitioner may be informed that his methods of practice, 
although recognized amoung hundreds of practitioners across the 
United States, would be unprofessional conduct for one practicing 
in Utah. 
It is clear from the decisions of this Court that the 
standards of practice and care required of a physician are not to 
practice as all others do or even as the majority may do, but in 
the case of Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P2d 663 
(1967) this Court concluded: 
"The law does not impose upon a 
physician or surgeon the duty of guaranteeing 
that his treatment will achieve good results, 
but on the contrary, the law imposes upon him 
the duty to employ that care and skill 
required of men of similar calling, and under 
similar circumstances." 
-9-
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Further in Swan v. Lamb 584 P2d 814 (Utah 1978) this 
Court held that the standard of care for a doctor who professes 
expertise in a field of medicine should be held to the standard 
of care exercised by experts IN THE SAME FIELD, in cities of 
comparable size and throughout the medical profession. 
Not one expert IN THE SAME FIELD of "p~eventative 
medicine" testified against the Appellant. Much to the contrary 
the Board concluded its dee is ion based on the unexpressed 
opinions of the board members, even though the Respondents were 
well aware that hundreds of Doctors, both M.D. and n.o., 
throughout the Unites States use the modes of practice employed 
by Appellant herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's brief represents a· rude attempt by the 
office of the Attorney ,General to justify a statutorily 
disqualified committee, and by ignoring the clear cases cited by 
this Court to protect the procedural safeguards of license 
revocation proceedings, justify the revocation of the li~ense of 
an eminently qualified osteopathic physician ~nd surgeon, because 
his practice does not fit the mold of "the majority" of medical 
practitioners as represented by one osteopathic newcomer to Utah 
and the untestified opinidn of committee members. 
-10-
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The Appellant respectfully submits that the 
Respondent's revocation of Appellant's license cannot be 
sustained either procedurally or by the preponderance of the 
evidence adduced, and constitutes an a.rbitrary and capricious 
decision by the Department of Business Regulations as well as the 
District Court, and Appellant respectfully requests the Court to 
reverse the revocation and allow Appellant to continue his 
medical practice to provide care to the hundreds of patients who 
rely on Appellant for their medical needs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3o'f'f- day of July, 1982. 
M. RICHARD WALKER 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
de(wereJ 
I hereby certify that I ~ailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to STEVEN ~­
SCHWENDIMAN, Attorney for Respondent, at 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
11 M,J J)_"'1_"4-Sit 
---~-----day of~, 1982. 
84114, postage prepaid on this 
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